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GOOGLE’S CHINA PROBLEM: A CASE STUDY 
ON TRADE, TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS UNDER THE GATS 
Henry Gao 
ABSTRACT 
Trade and human rights have long had a troubled relationship. 
The advent of new technologies such as internet further complicates 
the relationship. This article reviews the relationship between trade, 
technology and human rights in light of the recent dispute between 
Google and China from both theoretical and practical perspectives. 
Starting with an overview of the internet censorship regime in China, 
the article goes on to assess the legal merits of a WTO challenge in 
this case. First, the article discusses which service sector or 
subsectors might be at issue. Second, the article analyzes whether 
and to what extent China has made commitments in each of the 
identified sector, as well as any limitation or restrictions that has 
been inscribed for such commitments. Next, the article reviews 
whether the Chinese internet filtering regime is in violation of these 
commitments and other relevant GATS obligations. In the 4th part, 
the article considers any exceptions that China might be able to 
invoke in the case of a breach. The tentative conclusion of the article 
is that, overall, Google does not have a strong case against China 
under WTO law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As in the universe, each planet, while turning on its own axis, 
moves only around the sun, so in the system of freedom each of its 
worlds, while turning on its own axis, revolves only around the 
central sun of freedom. To make freedom of the press a variety of 
freedom of trade is a defence that kills it before defending it, for 
do I not abolish the freedom of a particular character if I demand 
that it should be free in the manner of a different character? Your 
freedom is not my freedom, says the press to a trade. As you obey 
the laws of your sphere, so will I obey the laws of my sphere. To 
be free in your way is for me identical with being unfree, just as a 
cabinet-maker would hardly feel pleased if he demanded freedom 
for his craft and was given as equivalent the freedom of the 
philosopher. 
Karl Marx 
On Freedom of the Press 
Published in Rheinische Zeitung 
No. 139, Supplement 
May 19 1842 
For a long time, the relationship between trade law and human rights 
has been a subject of hot debate between scholars from both trade law and 
human rights circles. The latest Google episode in China provided yet 
another chance to revisit the debate. Compared to previous cases, this case 
is even more intriguing for the following reasons: first, unlike previous 
cases, which are mostly about the WTO-consistency of trade sanctions 
adopted in response to alleged human rights violations, the current one is a 
rare case on the possibility of using trade law to challenge directly the 
legality of national measures which are regarded as much as a trade law 
issue as a human rights issue. Second, and this point apparently relates to 
the first point, in most of the previous cases the alleged human rights 
violations affect almost exclusively only domestic individuals or firms, but 
in the current case the foreign firms are affected as much as, if not more 
than, the domestic firms. Third, the previous cases are mostly concerned 
with rules governing trade in goods, while most of the potential legal 
claims in the current case arise under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), an agreement people are much less familiar with. Fourth, 
to make the current case even more complicated, the main services at issue 
are those that only emerged since the dawn of the digital age, and it is 
highly unlikely that these services were even contemplated when the GATS 
rules were negotiated. All in all, these unique features make this case an 
interesting and challenging case study on the relationship between trade 
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and human rights in the digital era. 
In this article, the author will review the many issues – both theoretical 
and practical – that this case might raise for the WTO system. Starting with 
a brief explanation of the tools of internet control that the Chinese 
government employs against both domestic and foreign internet service 
providers, the article will assess the legal merits of a WTO challenge in this 
case. First, the paper will try to ascertain the service sectors or subsectors 
that might be at issue. Second, the article will discuss to what extent China 
has made commitments in each of the identified sector, as well as any 
limitation or restrictions that have been inscribed for such commitments. 
Next, we will discuss whether the Chinese internet filtering regime is in 
violation of these commitments and other relevant GATS obligations. In the 
fourth part, the article will discuss any exceptions that China might be able 
to invoke in the case of a breach. The article will conclude with suggestions 
on the practical course of action that might be taken in the current case and 
similar cases in the future, as well as thoughts on how useful the WTO 
rules may be as a weapon for protecting human rights. 
II. CENSORS AND SENSITIVITIES: ONLINE CENSORSHIP EXPLAINED 
In his first-ever written work as a revolutionary journalist – 
“Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction” – Karl Marx 
eloquently asked the Prussian censors to give people “a perfect press to 
whom you have only to give an order” “[i]nstead of a defective censorship 
whose full effectiveness you yourselves regard as problematic.”1 To help 
the clueless censors, Marx also suggested that “a model of [such perfect 
censorship] has been in existence for centuries in the Chinese state.”2 
Ironically, never would the father of Communism have thought that, 170 
years later, it is China that would provide not only the last refuge of the 
ideology named after him, but also yet another model of such “perfect” 
censorship regime. 
As noted by Marx, censorship is nothing new in China. For example, 
Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor of China who ruled during the second half 
of third Century B.C., was remembered in history not only for building the 
Great Wall that would keep the wild barbarians away from the virgin 
territories of his empire, but also for burning the ancient books to keep the 
“impure” thoughts away from the innocent minds of his subjects. 
Unfortunately, not even the mighty Great Wall can keep the Great Censor 
in power: the Draconian empire fell after merely 15 years – making it the 
                                                        
1 Karl Marx, Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction, Marx & Engels Internet 
Archive, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1842/02/10.htm (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2011). 
2 Id. 
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shortest among major dynasties in Chinese history. Such dire consequences, 
however, failed to prevent either the Great Wall or the Great Censor to 
resurrect in much more powerful modern forms 2,000 years later. 
While the history of the Internet in China can be traced back to as early 
as 1994,3 until the late 90’s the Internet still remained a rarity among the 
general population. With the dawn of the new millennium, however, the 
Internet started to take off and grew at exponential rate. This phenomenal 
growth is well summarized by “The Internet in China,” a white paper 
issued by the State Council of China in June 2010: 
China has injected enormous sums of money into Internet 
infrastructure construction. From 1997 to 2009 a total of 4.3 
trillion yuan4 was invested in this regard, building a nationwide 
optical communication network with a total length of 8.267 
million km. Of that, 840,000 km was long-distance optical cables. 
By the end of 2009 Chinese basic telecommunications companies 
had 136 million broadband Internet access ports, and 
international outlet bandwidth was 866,367 Mbps, with seven 
land-submarine cables and 20 land cables, that had a combined 
capacity exceeding 1,600 Gb. That ensured Internet access to 
99.3% of Chinese towns and 91.5% of villages, and broadband to 
96.0% of the towns. [ . . . ] 
The construction and improvement of the Internet 
infrastructure has beefed up the spread and application of the 
Internet. By the end of 2009 the number of Chinese netizens had 
reached 384 million, 618 times that of 1997 and an annual 
increase of 31.95 million users. In addition, the Internet had 
reached 28.9% of the total population, higher than the world 
average. At the same time, there were 3.23 million websites 
running in China, which was 2,152 times that of 1997. The 
number of IPv4 addresses approached 230 million, making China 
the second-largest owner in the world. Of all the netizens, 346 
million used broadband and 233 million used mobile phones to 
access the Internet. They had moved on from dialing the access 
numbers to broadband and mobile phones. These statistics make 
China among the top of the developing countries in developing 
and popularizing the Internet. 
                                                        
3 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper: The 
Internet in China, June 8, 2010, Beijing, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
4 Yuan, or Renminbi, is the Chinese currency. As of August 29, 2010, 1 U.S. Dollar equals 6.8 
Renminbi. 
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With its rapid development, the Internet also quickly emerged as a 
major engine for economic development, which again is recounted in the 
white paper: 
In the past 16 years the average growth rate of the added 
value of Chinese IT industry grew at over 26.6% annually, with 
its proportion in the national economy increasing from less than 
1% to 10%. [ . . . ] In 2008 Internet-related industries generated 
a turnover of 650 billion yuan, with sales of Internet-related 
equipment reaching 500 billion yuan-worth, accounting for 1/60 
of China’s GDP, and 1/10 of its global trade. Its software 
operations had a turnover of 19.84 billion yuan, up 26% over 
2007. . . .  
According to a sample survey, over 50% of big enterprises 
have established e-commerce system, over 30% of small and 
medium-sized companies find their product suppliers through the 
Internet, 24% of them are engaged in marketing via the Internet, 
and there are over 100 million online buyers in China. In 2009 
the trade volume of e-commerce in China surpassed 3.6 trillion 
yuan-worth. [ . . . ] 
Online gaming, animation, music and videos are emerging 
rapidly, greatly multiplying the overall strength of the Chinese 
culture industry. In the past five years, the average annual 
increase rate of online advertisement has maintained a level of 
30%, with its turnover reaching 20 billion yuan in 2009. The 
online gaming industry in China had a turnover of 25.8 billion 
yuan in 2009, an increase of 39.5% over 2008, ranking top in the 
world. Online literature, music, radio and television in China 
have all witnessed rapid development. The increasingly 
expanding cyber culture consumption is encouraging the birth of 
many new industries and spurring the growth of the business 
income of telecommunications services. By March 2010 more 
than 30 Chinese Internet-related companies had been listed in the 
United States and Hong Kong, as well as on China’s mainland. 
Lest anyone think that the rapid development of the Internet means that 
the Chinese authorities have loosened its iron grip on the cyberspace, read 
the following paragraphs from the white paper: 
Since 1994 China has enacted a series of laws and regulations 
concerning Internet administration, including the Decision of the 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee on Guarding 
Internet Security, Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
2011] GOOGLE’S CHINA PROBLEM  353 
 
 
Electronic Signatures, Regulations on Telecommunications of the 
People’s Republic of China, Measures on the Administration of 
Internet Information Services, Regulations on the Protection of 
Computer Information System Security of the People’s Republic 
of China, Regulations on the Protection of the Right to Online 
Dissemination of Information, Provisions on the Administration 
of Foreign-funded Telecommunications Enterprises, Measures on 
the Administration of Security Protection of the International 
Networking of Computer Information Networks, Provisions on 
the Administration of Internet News Information Services, and 
Provisions on the Administration of Electronic Bulletin Services 
via the Internet, among others. Relevant provisions of the 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, General 
Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Minors, Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Punishments in Public Order 
and Security Administration and other laws are applicable in the 
case of Internet administration. 
Not surprisingly, Internet censorship is featured high on the regulatory 
agenda. Take, for example, Measures for Security Protection 
Administration of the International Networking of Computer Information 
Networks,5 which – issued in December 1997 – is one of the first Internet 
regulations ever issued by the Chinese government. Article 5 of the 
Measures list nine types of information that one shall not “produce, 
duplicate, search and disseminate” on the Internet, e.g., 
(1) information that instigates the resistance and disruption of 
the implementation of the constitution, laws and 
administrative regulations; 
(2) information that instigates the subversion of the state 
political power and overthrow of the socialist system; 
(3) information that instigates the splitting up of the country and 
sabotage of national unity; 
(4) information that instigates hatred and discrimination among 
nationalities and sabotages solidarity among nationalities; 
(5) information that fabricates or distorts facts, spreads rumors 
and disrupts social order; 
                                                        
5 Measures for Security Protection Administration of the International Networking of Computer 
Information Networks (Promulgated by the Decree No. 33 of the Ministry of Public Security, art.5 
(P.R.C.) (Dec. 16, 1997), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/cn/cn115en.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
354 AJWH [VOL. 6:347 
 
 
(6) information that propagates feudalistic superstitions, 
obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, murder and 
terror and instigates crimes; 
(7) information that openly insults others or fabricates facts to 
slander others; 
(8) information that damages the reputation of state organs; and 
(9) other information that violates the Constitution, laws and 
administrative regulations. 
Among the nine categories, six ((1)-(5) and (8)) are obvious examples 
of political censorship, while the remaining three all include elements that 
can be interpreted in such a way to censor political information as well. 
Below are two examples of such “creative interpretation”: 
1. Using fabricated facts to slander others: The Yan Xiaoling – Fan 
Yanqiong case (also known as the Fujian Netizen Case).6 In February 
2008, Yan Xiaoling, a 25-year old woman in Fujian Province was 
found dead. While the forensic experts from the local police 
pronounced the cause of death to be ectopic pregnancy, Yan’s mother 
concluded from her own investigation that her daughter died from 
being mass-raped by a group of ruffians that are connected to the local 
police. During her journey to seek justice for her daughter, Yan’s 
mother met Fan Yanqiong, a human rights activist based in Fuzhou, the 
capital of Fujian. Upon learning her story, Fan posted a summary of the 
case online in June 2009. Within 72 hours, Fan found herself arrested 
by the local police. After two court hearings in November 2009 and 
March 2010 that lasted two minutes each, Fan was sentenced to two 
years imprisonment for slandering by the Mawei District Court. In June 
2010, the Fuzhou Intermediary Court rejected Fan’s appeal and 
affirmed the original sentence.7 
2. Using online information to propagate feudalistic superstitions: The 
most famous example for this type of censorship is the anti- Falungong 
Campaign8 and the subsequent blockage of the Falun Dafa website, 
                                                        
6 Guo Bao Feng, Muqian Fujian Wangmin Wugao Xianhai An Zuiquan Ziliao [The Most Complete 
Data Collections for the Fujian Netizen Case] (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=48592 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
7 Zheng Liang, Fuzhou Fan Yanqiong You Jingyou Wu Huaying Wangluo Feibang An Ershen 
Weichi Yuanpan [Judgment in the Internet Defamation Case Against Fan Fan Yanqiong, You 
Jingyou and Wu Huaying Affirmed on Appeal by Fuzhou Court] (June 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/201006/28/415837.shtml(last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
8 See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Xin Wen Chu Ban Shu Guan Yu Chong Shen You Guan 
Fa Lun Gong Chu Ban Wu Chu Li Yi Jian De Tong Zhi [Notice of the General Administration of 
Press and Publication of PRC Reiterating the Advice to Dispose Books Relating to Falun Gong] 
(July 22, 1999), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/10/20000706/132292.html 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011); Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Guan Yu Gong Chan Dang Yuan Bu Zhun 
Xiu Lian Fa Lun Da Fa De Tong Zhi [Notice of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
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which many people are familiar with. The full potential of this 
provision was revealed in a most bizarre recent case. In this case, the 
Trademark Appraisal Committee (TAC) of the Chinese State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce turned down an application 
by Blizzard Entertainment, a well-known American video game 
developer, to register its popular online game “Star Craft: Ghost” as a 
trademark. In their decision, the TAC explained that “Star Craft” means 
“astrology” while “Ghost” refers to the spirit of the dead. Thus, if 
registered, the proposed trademark would serve to preach “feudal 
superstitions” and destroy the high public morale of Socialism. When 
Blizzard launched a judicial review to overturn the TAC decision, the 
First Intermediary Court of Beijing rejected the request in a decision 
handed down in February 2009.9 
With minor variations, the nine categories of main targets of online 
censorship have been faithfully copied in the other main regulations, i.e., 
Decision of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on 
Guarding Internet Security (2000), Measures on the Administration of 
Internet Information Services (2000), and Regulations on 
Telecommunications of the People’s Republic of China (2002). Through 
these laws and regulations, China built up its regulatory framework on 
Internet control and online censorship. 
The consistency of the Internet “Black-list” in the different regulations 
seems to indicate that the Chinese authorities always have a clear idea on 
what they wish to censor since the very beginning. In contrast, they do not 
seem to be so confident on how the censorship should be achieved. 
Otherwise, they would not have spent billions of dollars on one project 
after another from the Great Firewall to Golden Shield to Green Dam. As 
this paper is mainly about the trade law implications of online censorship, I 
will not engage in an exhaustive discussion on the many complex 
techniques of Internet control, which has been subject to extensive analysis 
elsewhere.10 Instead, I will focus on the recent Google episode, and only 
                                                                                                                          
Party on the Prohibition of Party Members to Practice Falun Gong] (July 19, 1999), available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/10/20000706/132282.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2011); 
Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Min Zheng Bu Guan Yu Qu Di Fa Lun Da Fa Yan Jiu Hui De 
Jue Ding [Decision of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on the Abolition of the Association on the Study 
of Falun Dafa] (July 22, 1999), available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/10/20000706/132286.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011), 
which designated Falun Gong as an “evil cult” that “spread superstitious evil beliefs.” 
9 Chang Ming, Sheji Xuanyang Fengjian Mixin, Baoxue Gongsi Xin Shangbiao Zhuce Beibo Gao 
Shangpingwei [Blizzard Brought Case Against Trademark Appeal Board’s Decision to Reject 
Registration of Its New Trademark for Promoting Feudal Superstitions] (Feb. 13, 2009), available 
at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200902/13/344450.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
10 For a detailed discussion on the filtering techniques commonly-used around the world, see 
Steven J. Murdoch & Ross Anderson, Tools and Technology of Internet Filtering, in ACCESS 
DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 57 (Ronald Deibert et al. 
eds., 2008). For a detailed account of the specific techniques employed by the Chinese authorities, 
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discuss the technical issues as necessitated by the analysis on the legal 
issues arising from the case. 
III. BUILDING A LEGAL CASE: THE GOOGLE COMPLAINT 
While Google.com has been available to users in China just like in the 
rest of the world since its launch in January 1996, the google.cn service – 
which is devoted explicitly to the Chinese market – is not launched until 10 
years later. In a public announcement11 issued at the time of the launch of 
google.cn, Google explained that, having a dedicated Chinese version 
would enable Google to provide a functional (but censored) service, rather 
than the uncensored service that was barely functional.12 
In January 2010, Google announced13 that they are adopting a “new 
approach to China” due to “a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on 
our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft 
of intellectual property from Google” discovered in the previous December. 
Such attack (which Google described in detail in the statement), coupled 
with unsuccessful attempts to compromise the Gmail accounts of human 
rights activists and “attempts over the past year to further limit free speech 
on the web” (which Google did not explain in detail) have led Google to 
conclude that they should “review the feasibility of [the] business 
operations in China.” As the result of such review, Google decided that they 
“are no longer willing to continue censoring [the] results on Google.cn,” 
and “will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which 
[Google] could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all.” 
On 22 March 2010, Google further announced that they have, from the 
date of announcement, stopped censoring the search services on Google.cn. 
Instead, users visiting Google.cn are now being redirected to 
Google.com.hk, where Google offers “uncensored search in simplified 
Chinese, specifically designed for users in mainland China and delivered 
                                                                                                                          
see R. McKinnon, Testimony in the Hearing on Google and Internet Control in China: A Nexus 
Between Human Rights and Trade?, held by Congressional-executive Commission in China, 
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/2010/20100324/mackinnonTestimony.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011). See also Country Profile: China, in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, 
RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 449, 449-87 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010). 
11  Andrew McLaughlin, Google in China (Jan. 27, 2006), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/01/google-in-china.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
12 Id. According to McLaughlin, before the launch of google.cn, “Google.com appears to be down 
around 10% of the time. Even when users can reach it, the website is slow, and sometimes 
produces results that when clicked on, stall out the user’s browser. Our Google News service is 
never available; Google Images is accessible only half the time.” Google admitted that the level of 
service provided by google.com is something “not very good.” 
13  David Drummond, A New Approach to China (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
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via our servers in Hong Kong.”14 
In another update issued in June 2010, Google stated that, while the 
automatic redirecting from google.cn to google.com.hk has been working 
well for the users and for Google, it didn’t seem to work for the Chinese 
government, which threatened to not renew Google’s Internet Content 
Provider (ICP) license if the redirecting continued. Without the ICP license, 
Google would have to discontinue its google.cn service. After exploring 
possible alternatives, Google decided to change the landing page of 
google.cn to one that links to Google.com.hk instead of automatically 
redirecting all users. Google claimed that “this new approach is consistent 
with our commitment not to self censor and, we believe, with local law” 
and re-submitted its ICP license renewal application based on this approach. 
On July 9, Google’s renewal application was approved by the government. 
While Google has approached the USTR for challenging China’s 
policy as a trade barrier under the rules of the WTO, so far neither the 
USTR nor Google has made clear the exact facts or the legal basis for their 
case. This could be because the information is sensitive, but the more likely 
explanation is that even Google itself does not have the full picture. Indeed, 
as Robert Boorstin, Google director of corporate and policy 
communications, admitted on June 11 2010, while “Google believes very 
strongly that censorship is a trade barrier,” they are still “not quite clear yet 
exactly how solid [Google] can make [the case];” instead, Google is still 
“in the middle of drawing up [the] evidence and [the WTO] case.”15 Thus, 
I will have to limit my analysis on the basis of the information that is 
publicly available at the time of the writing. 
As we can see from the chronology of the events above, Google’s 
problems in China include the following: A. theft of Google’s intellectual 
property; B. attempt to invade accounts of certain Gmail users; C. blocking 
of the service of google.com; and D. self-censorship by Google of the 
information on google.cn. 
Among the four, the first two are obviously not covered by the WTO 
for the following reasons. First, as an inter-governmental organization, the 
rules of the WTO only apply to measures by the government. However, in 
the current case, Google has not made explicit allegation that the attacks are 
either conducted directly or authorized by the Chinese government. Second, 
even if Google later did make such allegations, the evidentiary burden 
would be insurmountable due to the sensitive nature of the case. Third, 
even if Google could provide sufficient evidence to substantiate its 
                                                        
14  David Drummond, A New Approach to China: An Update (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011). 
15 Inside U.S.-China Trade, Google, Allies Preparing Data, Legal Case For Challenging Internet 
Censorship (June 23, 2010). 
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allegations, it is still very unlikely to find such attacks explicitly authorized 
by laws and regulations of China. Instead, such attacks probably violate 
China’s own laws and thus would not be regarded as “government 
measures” regulated by the WTO. To use a simple analogy, if a Chinese 
official violates China’s own anti-corruption laws by demanding bribes 
from an American company that export goods to China, the correct legal 
remedy to pursue would be a prosecution under China’s domestic criminal 
law rather than a WTO case on violation of MFN or national treatment 
obligations against the Chinese government. 
The remaining two are obviously covered by the WTO rules. First, they 
“affect” the provision of services by Google. Second, they are “measures 
by the government,” as evidenced by the government regulations 
mentioned in the last part. The differences between the two are: 
First, because google.com has its server in California, thus its service is 
provided either through mode 1 – cross-border supply or mode 2 – 
consumption abroad,16 but not mode 3. On the other hand, google.cn, at 
least before the redirecting, had its server in China. Therefore its service 
must be provided through mode 3 – commercial presence. Nonetheless, as 
we will discuss later, the differentiation of the different modes of supply is 
meaningless because China has not made different commitments for the 
different modes. Furthermore, the issue has become moot as now the most 
important services on google.cn are provided across the border from its 
servers in Hong Kong, which is a separate WTO Member. 
Second, the blocking of google.com is done by the Chinese 
government, while the censorship of google.cn is conducted by Google 
itself. While such distinction might make a big difference for human rights 
scholars, for the purpose of our discussion such difference is immaterial: 
regardless of the identify of the enforcer of the censorship, what really 
matters is that both are done pursuant to the same government measures 
that affect trade in services. 
                                                        
16 In most Mode 2 scenarios, the consumer has to physically cross the border. But this does not 
necessarily mean that the physical presence of the consumer is always required. In some cases, it’s 
the goods rather than the consumers which cross the border. As noted by the WTO Secretariat, the 
key distinction between Modes 1 and 2 is “whether the service is delivered within the territory of 
the Member from the territory of another Member or whether the service is delivered outside the 
territory of the Member.” In the case of Google’s search services, while the consumer does not 
travel physically across the border, the search query of the consumer needs to be sent to the Google 
server in California, analyzed and given an answer, and sent back to the consumer. If we view the 
Google search process this way, the services provided by Google is very similar to the services 
provided by a ship repair firm that receives ship from a foreign consumer, repairs it and sends it 
back. Such service is Mode 2 as it is a service that is supplied “in the territory of one Member to 
the service consumer of any other Member.” For more discussion on the increasingly blurring line 
between the two modes, see Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines for the Scheduling of 
Specific Commitments Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), attachment 2 & 
3, S/L/92 (Mar. 28, 2001); WTO Secretariat, Cross-border Supply (Modes 1 & 2), ¶¶ 9-10, 
S/C/W/304 (Sept. 18, 2009). 
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IV. WHICH SERVICE SECTOR? 
While Google’s website list more than two dozen different “products,” 
Google’s main business is actually in services rather than physical products 
(with the exception of the Nexus One Mobile Phone, which has been 
discontinued). Most of these products revolve around Google’s core 
competence – search, be it searching webpages, news stories, photos, 
videos, journal articles or books. There are also a handful of products 
which provide services other than search, for example Google Chrome (a 
browser), Gmail (online email), Docs (similar to Microsoft Office), 
Blogger (a blog publishing tool), Picasa (online photo album), and 
YouTube (online video-sharing website), etc. These products can be 
grouped roughly into two categories: first, online information searching 
services (including the main features of google.com), which Google takes 
information generated by other people using external platforms and tools, 
indexes and archives them, and allows users to search for these information 
in a variety of ways. This is akin to yellow pages (or libraries) with 
expanded functions; second, online hosting and publication services 
(including Blogger, YouTube and Picasa), where Google provides the 
platform and tools for a first group of users to generate contents and store 
them, then a second group of users can, where applicable, access, view or 
search the contents generated by the first group. 
In addition, there is a third category of services that derive from the 
two categories mentioned above: advertising services. As almost all of its 
services are provided free of charge to the consumers, Google attracts a lot 
of users. In turn, Google sells the attention of its users to businesses by 
providing advertising services. Again this is very similar to the business 
model of yellow pages, which itself is provided free of charge to the 
consumer households but advertising spaces in the Yellow pages are sold to 
businesses which want to reach a wide audience. Advertising is the main 
revenue source for Google. For example, out of Google’s total revenue of 
US$ 23.65 billion in 2009, 22.89 billion, or about 96.8%, are from 
advertising.17 
In summary, Google’s services include three main categories: online 
information searching services; online hosting and publication services; and 
advertising services. Among the three, the last one is the easiest to classify 
in the GATS. According to Services Sectoral Classification List (W/120)18, 
advertising services is classified as a service in the “Other Business 
Services” sub-sector under Section 1: Business Services. The other two, 
however, are difficult to translate into GATS parlance. 
                                                        
17  Google Investor Relations, 2011 Financial Tables, 
http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
18 WTO Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991). 
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Let’s start with the easier one. In the Services Sectoral Classification 
List, publishing services is included as a service in the “Other Business 
Services” sub-sector. Given the principle of “technology-neutrality,” this 
might be taken to indicate that the online hosting and publishing services 
shall also be included. However, when we dig a little bit deeper, the answer 
becomes elusive. In addition to the textual description, the Classification 
List also provides the corresponding CPC code to individual services. For 
publishing services, the code is subclass 88442 in the provisional CPC 
[hereinafter CPCprov], which is listed in the CPCprov as follows: 
Section: 8  Business services; agricultural, mining and 
manufacturing services. 
Division: 88  Agricultural, mining and manufacturing services. 
Group: 884 – Services incidental to manufacturing, except to the 
manufacture of metal products, machinery and equipment. 
Class: 8844 – Manufacture of paper and paper products; 
publishing and printing, on a fee or contract basis. 
Subclass: 88442 – Publishing and printing, on a fee or contract 
basis. 
From this structure, we can see that subclass 88442 is meant to include 
only publishing services that satisfy two conditions: first, the service must 
be “incidental to manufacturing” (this applies to all the services covered in 
Group 884); second, the service must be provided “on a fee or contract 
basis.” Unfortunately, none of the Google products mentioned above satisfy 
either condition. First, services such as Blogger, YouTube and Picasa are 
generally not provided as something “incidental to manufacturing.” Second, 
as Google provides these services for free to consumers, they are not 
provided “on a fee or contract basis.” Thus, it is unlikely that the online 
hosting and publishing services provided by Google will be covered under 
“publishing services.” 
Can sub-sectors other than “publishing services” cover Google’s 
services? A review of Services Sectoral Classification List reveals two 
possibilities. The first concerns only YouTube. According to the China – 
Audio-visual Products case, “video distribution services” covers online 
video distribution services, which certainly include YouTube. The second 
possibility is to view all Google’s online hosting and publication services 
(including blogger, YouTube and Picasa) with a fresh perspective. 
Regardless of what they offer, they all share one thing in common: they 
provide a way for consumers to store some information online, and for 
others to access and retrieve such information. Viewed this way, it does not 
matter whether the contents being stored online are videos, pictures, or 
personal diaries. They are all just plain bytes in the eyes of the computer, 
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and they should be treated the same way as we treat the storage of other 
information online, as provided by Google’s main search service. The only 
difference between online information searching services and online 
hosting and publication service is that the information searchable in the 
former case is not necessarily created using tools provided by Google (such 
as Blogger) or stored on Google’s server, while in the latter case, the 
information is either created using a tool provided by Google (Blogger), or 
stored on Google’s server (YouTube and Picasa). However, as our focus of 
inquiry in the current case is what kind of services Google is providing 
regarding these information, rather than where these information are 
created or stored, they can be viewed together as one service: online storage 
and retrieval of data. 
For online storage and retrieval of data, again Services Sectoral 
Classification List provides four possibilities: 
1. On-line information and data base retrieval (7523) under the 
Telecommunication Services sub-sector of Communication Services 
Sector; 
2. On-line information and/or data processing (incl. transaction 
processing) (843) under the same subsector as the first; 
3. Data processing services (843) under the “Computer and Related 
Services” sub-sector of Business Services sector; and 
4. Data base services (844) under the same “Computer and Related 
Services” sub-sector as above. 
Because Services Sectoral Classification List does not provide detailed 
explanations on each service activities, their exact meanings shall be 
ascertained by consulting the explanatory note in the CPC. As mentioned 
above, “On-line information and/or data processing” and “Data processing 
services” services refer to the same CPC number. Thus we basically have 
three CPC numbers: 7523, 843 and 844. Now let’s find out which one 
offers the best match for Google’s services. 
First is Class 7523, which is defined in CPCprov as “data and message 
transmission services.” However, as no explanatory note is provided at the 
Class level, we have to go one level lower to find the detailed explanations. 
7523 includes two subclasses, which are further defined as follows: 
Subclass: 75231 – Data network services – Network services 
necessary to transmit data between equipment using the same or 
different protocols. This service can be provided via a public or 
dedicated data network (i.e., via a network dedicated to the 
customer’s use). 
Subclass: 75232 –  Electronic message and information 
services –Network and related services (hardware and software) 
necessary to send and receive electronic messages (telegraph and 
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telex/TWX services) and/or to access and manipulate information 
in databases (so-called value-added network services). 
The explanatory notes indicate that 7523 only covers the necessary 
network services (mostly the underlying hardware) for data transmission, 
rather than the provision of info online. Thus, it does not seem to cover 
search engine services like Google. 
As further support for this interpretation, we can look at the other 
services covered in the telecom services sector. Among all the individual 
telecom services included in Services Sectoral Classification List, nine 
refers to 7523. They are: 
b. Packet-switched data transmission services  7523** 
c. Circuit-switched data transmission services  7523** 
d. Telex services        7523** 
g. Private leased circuit services    
7522**+7523** 
h. Electronic mail       7523** 
i. Voice mail        7523** 
j. On-line information and data base retrieval  7523** 
k. electronic data interchange (EDI)    7523** 
l. enhanced/value-added facsimile services, incl. [ . . . ]   
          7523** 
As we can see, these services all refer to the underlying network 
services for the transmission of data, rather than the provision of content 
online. Thus, they do not cover Google’s services. 
The next option is Group 843 “Data processing services.” Again we 
need to refer to the detailed explanation at the subclass level, which are as 
follows: 
8431 84310 Input preparation services –  Data recording 
services such as key punching, optical scanning or other methods 
for data entry. 
8432 84320 Data-processing and tabulation services – 
Services such as data processing and tabulation services, 
computer calculating services, and rental services of computer 
time. 
8433 84330 Time-sharing services – This seems to be the same 
type of services as 84320. Computer time is bought; if it is bought 
from the customer’s premises, telecommunications services are 
also bought. Data processing or tabulation services may also be 
bought from a service bureau. In both cases the services might be 
time sharing processed. Thus, there is no clear distinction 
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between 84320 and 84330. 
Obviously, Google’s services would not be covered by either 8431 or 
8433. Instead, the only possibility is 8432. The note to 8432 refers to three 
forms, i.e., “data processing and tabulation services, computer calculating 
services, and rental services of computer time.” Apparently Google’s 
services are neither computer calculating services nor rental of computer 
time. Does that mean that it is data processing and tabulation services? 
Again the answer is no. Data processing and tabulation typically means the 
process of converting disorganized raw data into useful information that is 
arranged and presented in a systematic format. A good example is the 
service provided by market research firms, which take the raw data 
obtained from questionnaires and generate meaningful reports on the 
preferences of consumers that firms can use to guide their investment and 
production plans. Another example is the service provided by TurboTax 
Online, which is a popular software in the U.S. that helps clients to prepare 
their income tax return and file it electronically. While Google’s search 
services could offer something useful for the users, its level of 
sophistication is certainly not in the same league as the two examples given 
above and probably will not qualify as data processing or tabulation 
services. 
This leaves us with only Group 844 “Data base services.” This group 
includes only one class and one subclass, which are defined as follows: 
8440 84400 – Data base services –All services provided from 
primarily structured databases through a communication network. 
Exclusions: Data and message transmission services (e.g., 
network operation services, value-added network services) are 
classified in class 7523 (Data and message transmission 
services). 
As we can see from the explanatory note, there are two main attributes 
for the services covered in the subclass. First, the service must be provided 
from primarily structured databases. Second, it must be provided through a 
communication network. In my view, Google’s search services satisfy both 
conditions: 
First, while the websites in Google’s search results list are mostly not 
created or maintained by Google, this does not necessarily mean that 
Google’s search service is not provided through a database. Instead, given 
the speed and accuracy of Google’s search service, it would be unthinkable 
if Google did not have its own database which sift and organize the many 
websites and enable users to search for information and obtain results 
within a matter of seconds. Another proof is the availability of cached 
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versions of Google’s search results, which, roughly speaking, is a version 
of the webpage that Google captures at an earlier time and stores on its own 
server.19 Because of this, the cached version is not necessarily the same as 
the current version. This is most useful when the page is no longer 
available or has been modified from its former versions. If Google did not 
have its own database, how could it provide the cached versions when the 
current version may not even exist any longer? 
Second, Google’s service is provided mainly over the internet, which 
by definition is a kind of communication network. 
Thus, Group 844 seems to be the most appropriate match for Google’s 
search services. Under the Services Sectoral Classification List, 844 
corresponds to item C under the “Computer and Related Services” 
Sub-sector of “Business Services” sector. This reading is further confirmed 
by two more facts: 
First is the relationship between Group 844 and Class 7523. As 
mentioned above, database services could refer to either the data 
transmission services or the services provided using the actual data 
transmitted. To avoid confusion, Group 844 explicitly excludes “data and 
message transmission services” from its scope and states that they are 
covered by Class 7523. This not only confirms that Group 844 covers 
content services like Google’s search services, but also reaffirms our 
previous conclusion that Class 7523 covers network services but not the 
actual contents being carried over such network. 
Second is the current classification of internet search engines. One may 
argue that the CPCprov (which was published in 1990) and the Services 
Sectoral Classification List (which was drafted in 1991) are too out-dated 
to provide reliable guidance. Google certainly did not exist then, and the 
internet was only in its infancy. How could we expect the drafters of 
CPCprov and Services Sectoral Classification List to include a service 
which most people had not even heard of? On the other hand, the situation 
was entirely different when the latest version of the CPC, i.e., Ver.2, was 
completed: the time was the end of 2008, and both the internet and Google 
have become household names. Indeed, CPC Ver.2 does include explicit 
reference to online search engines, which is classified under Subclass 
84394 “web search portal content.” The explanatory note for 84394 states 
that the subclass includes “content provided on web search portals, i.e., 
extensive databases of Internet addresses and content in an easily 
searchable format”. Without any doubt, this certainly includes Google’s 
search service. Interestingly, the online version of the CPC Ver.2 also 
includes a link to “complete correspondences for this code.” A click on the 
link takes us to the Subclass 84300 “online information provision services” 
                                                        
19  Google Guide, Cached Pages: What Are Cached Pages?, 
http://www.googleguide.com/cached_pages.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
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under CPC Ver.1.1, which was updated in 2002. Again Subclass 84300 
includes another link to “complete correspondences for this code”, which 
takes us, not surprisingly, to Subclass 84400 and Group 844 under 
CPCprov. 
In summary, Group 844 is, in my view, the most appropriate 
classification for Google’s search services. 
V. CHINA’S SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 
Once we determine the sectoral classification for Google’s services, we 
should turn to China’s schedule of specific commitments to find out 
whether China has made commitments for the relevant sectors. Unlike the 
GATT, the GATS obligations on market access and national treatment apply 
only to sectors in which commitments have been scheduled. Thus, unless 
China has made commitments for the relevant sectors, Google will not find 
the legal basis for a case against China. Again let’s start with easier ones: 
First, advertising services. Here, China’s commitments seem to be 
quite liberal: there are almost no limitations on national treatment while the 
only limitation on market access is the right to provide such services in 
China. However, this is of no help to Google’s case as Google’s advertising 
services are not blocked in China.20 The only way Google may make a 
case is by arguing that China has somehow restricted Google’s ability to 
provide advertising services by blocking its search services, but this is 
rather unlikely considering that most of the blocked contents relates to 
either political or religious issues, none of which are of substantial 
commercial interests to businesses which wish to advertise their services. 
The second service is video distribution services, which, as we 
mentioned earlier, could encompass YouTube. Here China has committed 
to “none” for both modes 1 and 2, but YouTube is completely blocked in 
China. Thus, it is very clear that Google has a strong case in this sector. 
Regarding the other two sub-sectors, however, the picture again is less 
clear. Let’s take a look at the commitments in the respective sectors: 
First, for the computer services subsector, China has included the 
following services in its schedule: 
1. Consultancy services related to the installation of computer hardware 
 (CPC 841) 
2. Software implementation services  (CPC 842) 
3. Data processing services  (CPC 843) 
However, data base services (Group 844) are not included. This seems 
to indicate that China has made no commitment on search engines like 
Google. However, some scholars take a different view. They argue that 
                                                        
20  Google, Mainland China Service Availability, http://www.google.com/prc/report.html (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
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Google’s service should be classified under CPC 843.21 In support of their 
argument, they point out that the CPCprov was revised between the time of 
its first publication and China’s accession. As a result, the version that 
existed at the time of China’s accession was CPC Ver.1, which was 
completed in 1998 and include under Group 843 “On-line information 
provision services.” According to the explanatory note, this group includes 
the following services “database services; provision of information on 
web-sites; provision of on-line data retrieval services from databases and 
other information, to all or limited number of users; provision of on-line 
information by content providers,” which can certainly be interpreted to 
include search engines. 
In a way, their theory seems to find support from the ruling of the Panel 
in the China – Audio-visual case. One of the issues in that case is whether 
China has made commitments with respect to “sound recording distribution 
services.” According to China, the answer is no because “the electronic 
distribution of sound recordings as an established business and the legal 
framework for such business emerged only after the negotiation of its 
GATS Schedule and its accession to the WTO.”22 Thus, the services at 
issue is a new type of service totally different from the “sound recording 
distribution services” listed in China’s Schedule, as China could not have 
been expected to include in its schedule a service which did not exist at the 
time of its accession. At first, the Panel appears to agree in principle with 
China. According to the Panel, in seeking to “confirm the ‘common 
intention of Members’ with respect to a commitment in a GATS Schedule, 
evidence on the technical feasibility or commercial reality of a service at 
the time of the service commitment may constitute circumstances relevant 
to the interpretation of its scope under Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention.”23 As a result, “any evidence that sound recordings delivered 
in non-physical form were not, unlike today, technically possible or 
commercially practiced at the time China’s Schedule was negotiated might, 
in principle, be relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation with 
respect to the scope of that commitment.”24 However, upon examining the 
actual evidence submitted by the parties, the Panel ruled against China by 
concluding that “electronic distribution of music had become a technical 
possibility and commercial reality, albeit limited, by 1998, and in any case 
                                                        
21 See Tim Wu, The World Trade Law of Censorship and Internet Filtering, 7(1) CHI. J. INT’L L. 
263, 282 (2006); See also Brian Hindley & Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Protectionism Online: Internet 
Censorship and International Trade Law, 10-12 (ECIPE Working Page No. 12/2009), available at 
http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/protectionism-online-internet-censorship-
and-international-trade-law/PDF (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
22 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 7.1235, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009) 
[hereinafter China – Publications Panel Report]. 
23 Id. ¶ 7.1237. 
24 Id. 
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before the entry into force of China’s GATS Schedule following its 
accession to the WTO on 11 December 2001.”25 As we mentioned earlier, 
search engines have not only existed but also been widely used before 
China’s accession in late 2001. Thus, it seems that search engines, 
classified as CPC Group 843 and included in China’s schedule, should be 
among China’s commitments. 
In the view of the author, these arguments are rather absurd. First, as 
China has explicitly noted in its accession protocol, “CPC classification is 
added to the service sectors subject to state pricing in this Annex in 
accordance with the GATT document MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991, 
which provided services sectoral classification for the purpose of services 
negotiations during the Uruguay Round.” As the Services Sectoral 
Classification List itself was drafted on the basis of CPCprov, the 
corresponding codes under CPCprov rather than any subsequent editions 
should be used. Second, these arguments presume that China has made 
commitments for the entire Group 843. However, if we take a closer look at 
China’s commitments under “Data processing services (CPC 843),” we can 
see that this is not true. Instead of making a blanket commitment for all the 
services encompassed by 843, China only made commitments on three 
categories, i.e. “Input preparation services (CPC 8431); Data processing 
and  tabulation services (CPC 8432); and Time-sharing services (CPC 
8433).” The structure of the categories is identical to the one under 
CPCprov, but bears no resemblance to the one under CPC Ver.1. Quite the 
contrary, if we were to follow the new structure of CPC Ver.1, China could 
not have made any commitments on CPC 8431, 8432, & 8433. The reason 
is that CPC Ver.1 only includes one Class (8430) and one Subclass (84300) 
under Group 843. However, Class 8430 can be found nowhere in China’s 
services schedule! Last, if China indeed adopted the new CPC Ver.1, its 
commitment for Group 843 should read as “on-line information provision 
services,” which is the title under CPC Ver.1, rather than “Data processing 
services,” which is the title under CPCprov. It would be absurd to believe 
that, while the members of China’s WTO accession Working Party took so 
much trouble to have China make commitments in Group 843 under the 
new CPC Ver.1, they would somehow still allow China to use the title and 
structure provided under the old CPCprov. 
In summary, there is only one possible conclusion: China has not made 
commitment on Group 843 under CPC Ver.1, or Class 844 under CPCprov. 
Next, for telecom services subsector, China includes the following 
value-added services in its commitments: 
h. Electronic mail 
                                                        
25 Id. ¶ 7.1242. 
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i. Voice mail 
j. On-line information and database retrieval 
k. Electronic data interchange 
l. Enhanced/Value-added facsimile services 
(including store and forward, store and retrieve) 
m. Code and protocol conversion 
n. On-line information and/or data processing 
(including transaction processing) 
While there is no explicit reference to the CPC codes in China’s 
schedule itself, as the list in China’s services schedule copy verbatim the 
list in Services Sectoral Classification List, it is safe to assume that the list 
corresponds to the respective CPC codes under W120. As I discussed above, 
unfortunately no service in the list really encompasses Google’s search 
services. 
In summary, except regarding its YouTube service, Google would have 
great difficulty arguing for a case based on China’s commitments under the 
GATS. Nonetheless, for the sake of argument, I will still examine the 
possibilities of Google’s services being classified under either “computer 
and related services” or “telecom services,” and whether Google may have 
a legal case if such classification were accepted by the Panel. As I 
mentioned earlier, other than Group 844, there are two other possibilities: 
Class 8432 and Class 7523. To make our task simpler, I will only focus on 
the first three modes of supply as the blockage and censorship certainly 
does not apply to mode 4. Regarding Class 8432, China has committed to 
“none” for all three modes on both market access and national treatment. 
Regarding Class 7523, there are two entries in China’s commitments on 
value-added telecom services that might be relevant: j. On-line information 
and database retrieval; and n. On-line information and/or data processing 
(including transaction processing). The commitments for both are the same, 
i.e., “none” for national treatment, and the following for market access: 
(1) See mode 3. 
(2) None. 
(3) Foreign service suppliers will be permitted to establish joint 
venture value-added telecommunication enterprises, without 
quantitative restrictions, and provide services in the cities of 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing. Foreign investment in 
joint venture shall be no more than 30%. 
 Within one year after China’s accession, the areas will be 
expanded to include Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Fuzhou, 
Hangzhou, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, Shenzhen, 
Xiamen, Xian, Taiyuan and Wuhan and foreign investment 
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shall be no more than 49%. 
Within two years after China’s accession, there will be no 
geographic restriction and foreign investment shall be no 
more than 50%. 
(4) Unbound except as indicated in Horizontal Commitments. 
To summarize, the only restriction is the cap on foreign equity in 
modes 1 and 3, and censorship and blocking are clearly not such restriction. 
Thus, we do not have to decide under which mode of supply we shall put 
Google’s search services, as the commitments are essentially the same for 
our purposes. 
Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that Google’s search services, 
instead of being covered under CPC Group 844, is covered under either of 
the two sectors that we mentioned above, the next logical question would 
be: is internet filtering and censorship a trade barrier? 
This is where the issue gets tricky. In my view, a key distinction must 
be drawn between complete blocking and selective filtering. If the website 
is fully blocked, this would amount to a “total prohibition,” which, 
according to the U.S. – Gambling decision, is a “zero-quota” that violates 
the Market Access obligation under Article XVI. 
On the other hand, a different analysis must be applied to selective 
filtering, that is, instead of blocking a website completely, only part of the 
website is blocked. This is exactly the kind of situation that Google is in. 
For example, if you search for innocuous terms such as “iPhone,” you 
would get exactly the same results in China as what you would get in the 
U.S. On the other hand, if you were to search for “Falun Gong” in China, 
you would only get the sites that criticizes or condemns it but not those 
which supports the group. Apparently, selective filtering is not a restriction 
that is based on the “quantity” or “numerical quota” of the services at issue. 
Instead, the focus is on the “quality” of the services. You are allowed to 
have a million webpages on iPhone, but not even one short paragraph 
sympathetic to the Falun Gong is allowed. It is true that blocking some 
webpages has the effect of limiting market access. However, as the Panel 
made clear in U.S. – Gambling, the list in Article XVI.2 is exhaustive.26 If 
a measure does not take the form of one of the six categories, it is not a 
prohibited market access restriction, even if it has the effect of restricting 
market access. In this case, selective filtering is not a limitation on the 
number of service suppliers, or the total value of service transactions or 
assets, or the total number of service operations or the total quantity of 
service output. Thus, it should not be subject to the obligations on market 
                                                        
26 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, ¶ 6.298, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling Panel 
Report]. 
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access in Article XVI. Otherwise, many other WTO Members would be in 
technical violation of Article XVI simply by banning webpages that have 
pornographic contents (whether or not such measures could be justified by 
Article XIV is a totally different question that we will explore later). 
If selective filtering doesn’t come under Article XVI, then which GATS 
provision is applicable? There are three possibilities: 
A. National Treatment 
According to Article XVII of GATS, WTO Members shall “accord to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all 
measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than 
that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.” In the current 
case, the internet filtering is directed at foreign websites but not domestic 
ones. Does this mean that foreign firms like Google receive “less 
favorable” treatment than domestic service suppliers? In the view of the 
author, this is far from the truth. The only reason why domestic websites 
with similar contents as those found in foreign websites are not blocked is 
they can not be blocked for two reasons: first, due to the structure of the 
Great Firewall, the filtering only applies to websites with servers not based 
in China. If your server is based in China, you do not need to go through 
the Great Firewall at all. Thus, it is technically impossible to block 
domestic websites. Second, the more important reason why domestic 
websites are not subject to the filtering is because they do not contain 
contents which the censorship regime deems inappropriate. They either do 
not exist at all, or live very short lives. For example, if you try to compose 
a blog entry on Falun Gong in your blog maintained on a Chinese blogging 
website, you will receive the following error message when you try to post 
the entry on the blog: “Due to sensitive words contained in your entry, it 
cannot be posted.” Most likely, this error message is generated by some 
elaborate automated system that could be triggered by one of a number of 
sensitive words. Sometimes people try to play cat-and-mouse game with 
the system by twisting the spelling of the sensitive words, for example by 
intentionally misspelling “Falun Gong” as “Falun G0ng” or “Fal*n Gong.” 
While this could trick the system and allow the entry to be posted, within a 
matter of minutes you would find your entry disappears mysteriously. 
While you are wondering about the mystery, an email arrives in your inbox, 
and in it you will find the explanation for the mystery along with a stern 
warning from the administer of the blogging site to avoid creating any 
further trouble in the future. To draw an analogy, if we were to regard 
websites as human beings, the foreign websites would be aliens who are 
deemed as “persona non grata,” who are not allowed into the country but 
instead being repatriated into his home country whenever he tries to cross 
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the border; on the other hand, the domestic websites would be those fetuses 
who were aborted once the state discovered through some psychic scan that 
they were incarnations of devil, or those infants who were murdered when 
the state determines that, even though they were born to be normal, they 
somehow became possessed by some evil spirits after they were born. In 
such a case, we would certainly all agree that the aliens did not receive less 
favorable treatment than their domestic counterparts. Similarly, in the case 
of internet filtering, while only foreign sites are blocked, this does not mean 
that they receive “less favorable” treatment than domestic websites. This 
conclusion is also supported by paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article XVII, which 
states that a Member is not obliged to meet its national treatment obligation 
through formally identical treatment; instead, depending on the 
circumstances, formally different treatment could also translate into “no 
less favorable” treatments. 
B. Domestic Regulation 
While the national treatment obligation is of no help to Google’s case, 
the disciplines on domestic regulation contained in Article VI might 
provide fertile ground for a GATS-based claim: 
First, under Article VI.1, WTO Members shall ensure that “all 
measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered 
in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.” As anybody who has any 
experience with the Chinese online censorship regime will tell you, the 
regime is anything but “reasonable, objective and impartial.” It’s quite 
arbitrary, as anything could become sensitive words. For example, the 
sensitive words list includes not only Dalai Lama (the leader of the Tibetian 
government in exile) but also Jiang Zemin (the former president of China), 
as well as both Falun Gong and the Communist Party of China. In addition 
to the regular terms, whenever a new event occurs, the names of person, 
places or other key terms in the event will also be added to the list. Thus, 
when you wake up one morning, you might find that a term that was 
perfect legit tomorrow has been banned. As a real world example, in March 
2010, netizens around China found that even “carrot” and “thermostat” 
became sensitive words and all related searches were blocked.27 This will 
cause great inconveniences, especially for the people who, because of their 
occupation, have to use those terms on a daily basis. Of course, in the eyes 
of the Chinese authorities, all these are but a small price to pay for stability 
                                                        
27 The reason for the special treatment is because the Chinese term for carrot shares the same first 
character as President Hu Jintao, while the term for thermostat shares the same first character as 
Premier Wen Jiabao. See Posting of gzsums, to mitbbs.com, Hu Luo Bo & Wen Du Ji Cheng Wei 
Min Gan Ci [Carrot and Thermostat Are Becoming Sensitive Words] 
http://www.mitbbs.com/article_t/ChinaNews/32082851.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
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– the ultimate goal of the government. 
While the arbitrary system governs both domestic Chinese internet 
firms and foreign ones, it is particularly troublesome for foreign firms. As 
noted by an article in the New York Times Magazine, while they do not 
“actually talking about it much, everyone who lives and breathes Chinese 
culture understands more or less where those lines are.”28 In contrast, the 
foreign firms which “typically arrive in China expecting the government to 
hand them an official blacklist of sites and words they must censor” would 
“quickly discover that no master list exists.”29 “Instead, the government 
simply insists the firms interpret the vague regulations themselves. The 
companies must do a sort of political mind reading and intuit in advance 
what the government won’t like.”30 This also happened to Google, which 
were not given the blacklist either. How did they solve the problem? They 
“set up a computer inside China and programmed it to try to access Web 
sites outside the country, one after another. If a site was blocked by the 
firewall, it meant the government regarded it as illicit – so it became part of 
Google’s blacklist.”31 
Another relevant obligation under Article VI is paragraph 5, which 
requires Members to: 
not apply licensing and qualification requirements and technical 
standards that nullify or impair such specific commitments in a 
manner which: 
(i) does not comply with the criteria outlined in subparagraphs 
4(a), (b) or (c); and 
(ii) could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at 
the time the specific commitments in those sectors were made. 
In turn, the obligations referenced under paragraph 4 are that the 
requirements and standards shall be: “(a) based on objective and 
transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the 
service; (b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of 
the service; (c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a 
restriction on the supply of the service”. 
As discussed above, the Chinese censorship regime is rather arbitrary. 
There are no objective criteria, and even if there are such criteria they are 
not made known to the public, thus also failing the transparency 
                                                        
28 Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem), N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 
2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/23google.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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requirement. As noted by the New York Times Magazine article, the 
Chinese censorship regime relies heavily on self-censorship, “[t]he Chinese 
system relies on a classic psychological truth: self-censorship is always far 
more comprehensive than formal censorship . . . . The government’s 
preferred method seems to be to leave the companies guessing, then to call 
up occasionally with angry demands that a Web page be taken down in 24 
hours.” “As a result, Internet executives in China most likely censor far 
more material than they need to.” 
Being largely a guess-work, the Chinese censorship regime probably 
creates more burden than necessary. A regime that is based on 
clearly-identified and transparent criteria would take out the need for the 
“political mind reading” and be much less burdensome. 
While there is a good chance that the Chinese censorship regime is in 
violation of two of the three obligations under paragraph 4, this does not 
necessarily mean that it will be found inconsistent with paragraph 5(a). As 
paragraph 5(a) is designed as an interim obligation that applies before the 
relevant disciplines for a given sector is developed pursuant to paragraph 4, 
it includes another key condition that must be satisfied even if a violation 
under paragraph 4 can be found. This condition is in paragraph 5(a)(ii), i.e., 
the standards or requirements is applied in a manner that “could not 
reasonably have been expected of that Member at the time the specific 
commitments in those sectors were made.” 
In my view, this could refer to either of the two situations: first, the 
relevant regulations on the standard or the requirement did not exist when 
the commitments are made; or second, while the regulations existed before 
the commitments are made, they are applied in a different manner now than 
before. This is where Google’s legal case might run into a problem: the list 
of banned information on the internet has not changed much ever since they 
first appeared in 1997 in Measures for Security Protection Administration 
of the International Networking of Computer Information Networks. While 
the exact operating mechanism of the censorship regime might have been 
fine-tuned and become more sophisticated since China’s accession, the 
general features of the regime, and the manner in which it operates, is more 
or less the same today as it was before late 2001, when China acceded to 
the WTO. 
Indeed, it might be safe to say that the situation was worse before 2001 
than after. As stated by Elliot Schrage, a senior Google executive in 2006, 
Since 2000, Google has been offering a Chinese-language 
version of Google.com, designed to make Google just as easy, 
intuitive, and useful to Chinese-speaking users worldwide as it is 
for speakers of English. Within China, however, Google.com has 
proven to be both slow and unreliable. Indeed, Google’s users in 
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China struggle with a service that is often unavailable. According 
to our measurements, Google.com appears to be unreachable 
around 10% of the time. Even when Chinese users can get to 
Google.com, the website is slow (sometimes painfully so, and 
nearly always slower than our local competitors), and sometimes 
produces results that, when clicked on, stall out the user’s 
browser. The net result is a bad user experience for those in 
China . . . . The cause of the slowness and unreliability appears 
to be, in large measure, the extensive filtering performed by 
China’s licensed Internet Service Providers (ISPs).32 
Thus, while a claim under Article VI:1 might be fruitful, Article VI:5 
would not be of much help to Google’s case. 
C. Most Favored Nation Principle 
According to GATS Article II, WTO Members shall “accord 
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any 
other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like 
services and service suppliers of any other country.” While the same Article 
also allows Members to schedule exemptions, none would apply in this 
case as China’s only exemptions are in the maritime transport sector. As the 
MFN obligation is an unconditional obligation, China would be obliged not 
to discriminate among foreign websites. 
Ironically, the Chinese censorship regime has as its main target Chinese 
language websites, be it based in China or abroad. The reason is not 
difficult to guess: as most people in China are proficient only in Chinese, 
filtering the Chinese language websites would get rid of most of the 
troubles. These websites are mostly based in countries with the largest 
number of Chinese immigrants, namely the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan 
and several European countries. Not surprisingly, these same countries also 
top the list of countries whose websites are subject to the filtering. In 
addition to Chinese language websites, most of the other websites are those 
in English and a few other commonly-used languages such as French and 
German. This would be a classical case of MFN violation, as service 
providers are being treated differently based on their respective country of 
origin, even if both might contain the same sensitive contents. 
                                                        
32 Elliot Schrage, Testimony of Google Inc. Before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and 
the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on 
International Relations, United States House of Representatives (Feb. 15, 2006), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internet-in-china.html (last visited Sept. 25, 
2011). 
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VI. POSSIBLE EXCEPTION UNDER ARTICLE XIV 
Assuming that some violations under Articles XVI and/or II can be 
found, China probably will try to defend its internet filtering regime under 
the general exceptions clause under Article XIV. As the Appellate Body 
stated in U.S. – Gambling,33 the application of the general exception clause 
requires a two-tier analysis: first, the challenged measure must fall under 
one of the paragraphs of Article XIV. If it doesn’t fit with any of the 
detailed exceptions therein, the measures will not be justified and the 
inquiry stops there. If, however, the measure can be justified under one of 
the exceptions, then the Panel shall move on to the second step, i.e., 
whether the measures satisfies the requirement under the chapeau. In the 
following part, we will follow these two steps to analyze the Google case. 
A. Protecting Public Morals or Public Order? 
Given the sensitive nature of online censorship, the most likely 
exception that China will invoke will be the “public morals/public order” 
exception under Article XIV(a). In U.S. – Gambling, the Panel noted that a 
Member invoking Article XIV (a) must demonstrate two elements, namely: 
“(a) the measure must be one designed to ‘protect public morals’ or to 
‘maintain public order;’ and (b) the measure for which justification is 
claimed must be ‘necessary’ to protect public morals or to maintain public 
order.”34 
Citing to the definition found in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
the Panel interpreted the term “public morals” to mean “standards of right 
and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation.”35 As to the “public order” exception, the original text includes a 
footnote, which states that “[t]he public order exception may be invoked 
only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society.” This note, read together with the 
dictionary meaning of the term, suggests that “public order” refers to the 
preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public 
policy and law.36 Thus, the Panel concludes that “public morals” and 
“public order” are two distinct concepts under Article XIV(a) of the 
GATS.37 At the same time, there are also some overlaps between the two 
as both concepts seek to protect largely similar values.38 For example, the 
                                                        
33  Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 292, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
34 U.S. – Gambling Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 6.455. 
35 Id. ¶¶ 6.463-.465. 
36 Id. ¶ 6.467. 
37 Id. ¶ 6.468. 
38 Id. 
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fundamental interests under the “public order” exception can relate, inter 
alia, to standards of morality, which is also within the domain of the 
“public moral” exception. 
As the Panel stated in the Gambling case, it was unnecessary in that 
case to determine which exception the U.S. measures fall under. So long as 
the challenged measure may be justified under either “public morals” or 
“public order”, it will be enough.39 Let’s first take a look at “public 
morals”, which was defined as “standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.” Recognizing the 
difference between the cultures and histories of different Members, the 
Panel generally allows some discretion for the Member invoking the 
exception, subject to the requirement that such discretion shall be kept in 
balance by the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of 
other Members.40 The question is, though, where shall we draw the line? In 
its accession package, Saudi Arabia invoked Article XX(a) to prohibit the 
importation of the Holy Quran. If that is permissible on religious grounds 
for a country that is predominantly Muslim, shall we allow another country 
to do the same even though they do not have a dominant religion? 
Extending the logic a bit further, shall the same leeway be accorded to a 
Member that is invoking the exception to ban foreign websites so that its 
people would not be corrupted by “Capitalist Liberalism thoughts”? 
In the view of the author, the answer to the last two questions lies 
primarily in whether or not such restrictions are supported by “standards of 
right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation.” Note here that the standard is that of “a community or nation,” 
rather than that of the government, not to mention that of a particular 
political Party. Moreover, the standard is one of “right or wrong,” not of 
“legal or illegal.” Thus, while government laws and regulations can be 
taken as an indicator of such standard, the fact that such standard has not 
made its way into formal legislation does not necessarily mean that such 
standard is not the one held by “a community or nation.” Vice versa, the 
mere fact that such standard happens to be the one adopted in the laws and 
regulations of a country does not automatically elevate it to the status of a 
standard held by “a community or nation.” Starting with the persecution of 
Christians by the Roman emperors, there have been many examples in 
history where the standard of right or wrong for “a community or nation” is 
not exactly the one forced by the government upon its people, or sometimes 
even the exact opposite of the one adopted by the ruling class. In such cases, 
the standard set by the government can hardly be taken as the one held by 
the “community or nation.” 
Applying the analysis above to the circumstances of the case, it is 
                                                        
39 Id. ¶ 6.469. 
40 Id. ¶ 6.452. 
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doubtful that the internet filtering or blocking could be justified as one that 
is dictated by the need to uphold the “standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation”. Save for a few 
pornographic or racist websites, it is doubtful that most Chinese would find 
having access to websites on democracy or the truth about “Tiananmen 
Incident” in 1989 offensive to their “standards of right and wrong conduct.” 
Let’s now turn to the “public order” exception, which serves to protect 
“fundamental interests of a society.” As noted by the Panel in U.S. – 
Gambling, the “fundamental interests of a society” is often reflected in 
public policy and law.41 Where then is a better place for the manifestation 
of such “fundamental interests of a society” than the Constitution? 
According to the Chinese Constitution, Chinese citizens shall enjoy the 
freedom of speech and press,42 the freedom of religious belief,43 the right 
to criticize public officials and make suggestions to any state organ or 
functionary,44 and the freedom to engage in scientific research, literary and 
artistic creation and other cultural pursuits.45 If these provisions really 
mean what they are supposed to mean, allowing people unhindered access 
to foreign websites would not pose “a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat . . . to one of the fundamental interests of society,” but, quite the 
contrary, serve to promote such “fundamental interests”. 
B. Necessity Requirement 
As the author has demonstrated in the last section, only a very weak 
case can be made to support the argument that internet filtering serves to 
protect “public morals” or “public order.” Given the importance of 
censorship to the Chinese government, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. 
will be willing to put on a good fight with China over this issue. In the 
China – Audio-visual Products case, where China invoked a similar 
defence under GATT Article XX(a) to justify its restriction on the 
importation of foreign books and films, the U.S. made clear that it did not 
intend to challenge the censorship regime per se.46 Instead, the U.S. only 
took issue with the means that China chose to achieve the stated purpose of 
protecting public morals. In other words, the U.S. only argued that China 
failed to satisfy the “necessity” requirement. As a matter of fact, the U.S. 
even suggested many ways that the Chinese government could employ to 
better serve the purpose of its censorship regime. If history can be of any 
guidance, in the Google case, the U.S. probably will not challenge the 
                                                        
41 Id. ¶ 6.467. 
42 XING FA [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] art. 35 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
43 Id. art. 36. 
44 Id. art. 41. 
45 Id. art. 47. 
46 China – Publications Panel Report, supra note 22, ¶ 7.808. 
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censorship regime directly, but will again focus on the “necessity” 
requirement. However, this time around, the US will have to face a much 
tougher case. 
In U.S. – Gambling, the Panel held that the term “necessary” refers to 
“a range of degrees of necessity . . . a ‘necessary’ measure is, in this 
continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of ‘indispensable’ than to 
the opposite pole of simply ‘making a contribution to.’”47 In determining 
whether or not a measure is “necessary”, a “weighing and balancing” test 
has to be applied.48 This includes the following components: “(a) the 
importance of interests or values that the challenged measure is intended to 
protect . . . ; (b) the extent to which the challenged measure contributes to 
the realization of the end pursued by that measure . . . ; (c) the trade impact 
of the challenged measure . . . .” 
Assuming that the U.S. will not challenge the censorship regime per se, 
our conclusions on the three components are as follows: 
First, by conceding the legitimacy of the censorship regime, the U.S. 
also implicitly recognizes the importance of the Communist values that the 
censorship regime intends to serve. In other words, the U.S. probably will 
not challenge the importance of these values. 
Second, as the filtering applies directly to the websites which contain 
sensitive information, it seems reasonable to conclude that it does make a 
contribution to the protection of public morals. 
Third, in terms of the trade impact of such measures, we have to 
consider instances of full blockage and selective filtering separately. If a 
website is blocked entirely, then the trade impact is quite large, as those 
parts of the websites which do not offend “public morals” are also blocked. 
However, selective filtering is probably fine as it only affects those 
webpages with “inappropriate” contents. Indeed, there is evidence to 
suggest that the internet filtering system in China is quite sophisticated and 
constantly evolves in response to changes in the web pages. According to a 
leading study by Zittrain and Edelman,49 
From our data, it appears that the set of sites blocked in China is 
by no means static: whoever maintains the lists is actively 
updating them, and certain general-interest high-profile sites 
whose content changes frequently appear to be blocked and 
unblocked as those changes are evaluated. (This is particularly 
noticeable with news sites such as CNN and Slashdot.) Some new 
                                                        
47 U.S. – Gambling Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 6.475. 
48 Id. ¶ 6.476. 
49 Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China, 
Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
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sites with sensitive content do not appear to take long to be 
blocked. 
In summary, the interests to be protected are quite important, and the 
filtering does make a direct and substantial contribution to the protection of 
public morals. Thus, while a full blockage might not be justified due to its 
significant restrictive effect on trade, a selective filtering, i.e., the one that 
is applied against Google, will probably be held as necessary. 
As we “yield a preliminary conclusion” that a measure is necessary 
after our “weighing and balancing” exercise, then we must, as explained by 
the Appellate Body in China – Audiovisual Product, try to confirm the 
necessity of the measure by comparing the measure with possible 
alternatives, in the light of the importance of the interests or values at 
stake.50 Unfortunately, again, as the trade-restrictive effect of a selective 
filtering mechanism is already minimal, it seems unlikely that there will be 
any possible alternatives which can refute the necessity of the regime. 
C. Non-discrimination Requirement Under the Chapeau 
Once we concluded that the selective filtering is provisionally justified 
under Article XIV(a), we shall then proceed to consider if the measure 
satisfies the requirement under the chapeau of Article XIV, which reads as 
follows: “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of 
measures.” 
As noted by the Panel in U.S. – Gambling, “the chapeau of Article XX 
of the GATT 1994 addresses not so much a challenged measure or its 
specific content, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied, 
with a view to ensuring that the exceptions of Article XX are not abused. In 
order to do so, the chapeau of Article XX identifies three standards which 
may be invoked in relation to the same facts: arbitrary discrimination, 
unjustifiable discrimination and disguised restriction on trade.”51 Citing the 
Appellate Body in U.S. – Shrimp, the Gambling Panel further explains that 
a finding of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” must include three 
elements: “First, the application of the measure must result in 
discrimination . . . . Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or 
                                                        
50 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services 
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 241, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 
21, 2009). 
51 U.S. – Gambling Panel Report, supra note 26, ¶ 6.581. 
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unjustifiable in character . . . . Third, this discrimination must occur 
between countries where the same conditions prevail.” 
In the current case, it seems such discrimination does exist. In addition 
to the uneven treatment of websites in different languages and based in 
different countries mentioned earlier, the study by Zittrain and Edelman 
also notices the uneven enforcement of the filtering on websites with 
different subjects. According to them: 
[E]ven some longstanding sites of apparent sensitivity remain 
unblocked. This is most easily noticed in our data with respect to 
sexually-explicit sites – we found blocking of only 13.4% of 
our sample of well-known sexually-explicit sites – but is also 
anecdotally apparent from our data, as one notes blocking of 
some U.S. intelligence sites but not others, etc. 
As both websites with political sensitive information and pornographic 
materials are deemed by the Chinese government to be against the “public 
morals,” China would have to explain why the internet filtering is enforced 
more strictly on political but not pornographic websites. Unless China is 
able to produce convincing arguments, its filtering regime will probably be 
stricken down as “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” under the 
chapeau. 
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In summary, it does not seem to be a good idea to use the Google case 
to challenge the Chinese internet censorship regime under the GATS legal 
framework. There are many significant legal obstacles that the US would 
have to overcome: 
First, the most likely sectoral classification for Google’s services is 
data base services, which China has not even included in its Schedule of 
Specific Commitments. 
Second, even if the U.S. could persuade the Panel to somehow classify 
the services at issue into one of the value-added telecom services, it would 
still be hard for the US to make a case for violations of Article XVI or XVII, 
at least for cases of selective filtering. Instead, the best legal case the US 
can make would be for violations of softer obligations under Articles VI 
and II. 
Third, should the U.S. manage to prove violations of some GATS 
obligations, it’s highly likely that China will invoke the “public morals” 
exception under Article XIV(a). If the U.S. follows its practice of not 
challenging China’s censorship regime per se, China might still be able to 
escape unscathed unless the Panel is willing to find that China has failed 
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prohibition against “arbitrary or unjustifiable discriminations” in the 
chapeau. 
Moreover, even if the U.S. could win a favorable decision in paper, it 
will find the actual implementation of the decision to be a bigger problem. 
Due to concerns over possible infringement on state sovereignty, WTO 
Panel and Appellate Body always end their decision with vague 
recommendation for the losing Member “to bring the relevant measures 
into conformity with its obligations under the WTO agreements” but never 
explicitly specify the exact measures that shall be taken to address the 
inconsistency. As a result, China might use one of the many different ways 
to achieve technical compliance with the Panel’s rulings that defeats the 
very purpose of the case. For example, to address violations of the MFN 
obligation or the prohibition against “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discriminations,” China could greatly expand its filtering regime to cover 
websites from all countries and in all languages; to comply with the 
obligation under GATS Article VI.5, China can further streamline and 
institutionalize its censorship regime. Alternatively, to save itself of all the 
trouble of having to revamp its censorship regime, China could adopt the 
easy route and choose either to revise its GATS pursuant to Article XXI or, 
following the wonderful example set by the U.S. in the Gambling case, 
simply refusing to comply and pay compensation instead. Indeed, given the 
recent statement by a senior Chinese official that places the preservation of 
the Communist regime as the number one “core interest” of China ahead of 
other key interests such as maintaining territorial integrity or economic and 
social development,52 no price seems to be too high for the Chinese 
government to pay to maintain its censorship regime. Just like their 
brothers in 1984, they understand too well that “who controls the past 
controls the future; who controls the present controls the past.”53 The 
power to control information, be it online or in books, is too important for 
the survival of the Communist regime to be given away. 
In conclusion, even a company as powerful as Google would find futile 
their attempt to search for the missing link between trade on the one hand, 
and human rights on the other hand. Even if they can win a WTO case on 
internet censorship, it will be a Pyrrhic victory. In this regard, Google 
would fare much better if they were to heed the advice of Philip Alston on 
the possibility to use WTO as a human rights forum: “[d]espite the 
expansion of the original GATT mandate into areas such as the services 
industries and intellectual property rights, and proposals to expand its role 
to cover the enforcement of regimes at the national level which are 
                                                        
52 Sun Jia Ye, Wai Jie Dui Zhong Guo He Xin Li Yi Bu Bi Da Jing Xiao Guai [Other Countries Do 
Not Need to Worry about the Code Interests of China], MING PAO (July 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/hb/2010/07-14/2401289.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
53 This is the slogan of the Party in George Orwell’s 1984. 
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favorable to international foreign investment, the basic structure of the 
Organization has remained unchanged. It is an institution which is 
dominated by producers, and in which the economic, social, cultural, 
political and various other interests of a great many people are not, in 
practice, represented. Its institutional structure, its processes and the 
outcomes it sanctions are far from what would be required of a body to 
which significant human rights authority could be entrusted.”54 While 
trade sanctions might be effective against human rights violations, trade law, 
at least in its current form, is not a good weapon to fight human rights 
violations. Only when Google and the US understand this can they realize 
that the best way to attack censorship regimes is not to hide behind the 
WTO and pretend that this can be addressed as a trade barrier problem, but 
to come forward and confront the Chinese government to deal directly with 
the human rights issues. While the human rights approach might not be as 
effective as the trade law route, it at least will not produce unintended 
consequences that push people further away from the essence of the 
problem, i.e., freedom of information, rather than freedom of trade.55 
 
                                                        
54 Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to 
Petersmann, 13(4) EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 836 (2002). 
55 Of course, the term “freedom of trade” used by Marx in his “On Freedom of the Press” has an 
entirely different meaning than the “freedom of trade” that the author refers to here. By “freedom 
of trade,” Marx means the freedom to conduct a particular trade or profession. In contrast, the 
author’s “freedom of trade” is more commonly known as “freedom to trade.” Notwithstanding the 
differences, however, the author still agree with Marx’s warnings, in the sense that just as freedom 
of the press shall not be made a variety of freedom of trade, human rights shall also not be made a 
variety of the right of free trade. 
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